The evolutionary dynamics of audit

dc.contributor.author	Αναστασόπουλος, Νικόλαος Π.	el
dc.contributor.author	Αναστασόπουλος, Μάρκος Π.	el
dc.date.accessioned	2015-05-23T15:18:48Z
dc.date.available	2015-05-23T15:18:48Z
dc.date.issued	2015-05-23
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11400/10988
dc.rights	Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/	*
dc.source	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221711005091	en
dc.subject	Dynamical systems
dc.subject	Auditing
dc.subject	Δυναμικά συστήματα
dc.subject	Ελεγκτικές
dc.title	The evolutionary dynamics of audit	en
heal.type	journalArticle
heal.classification	Science
heal.classification	Business management
heal.classification	Επιστήμες
heal.classification	Διοίκηση επιχειρήσεων
heal.classificationURI	http://skos.um.es/unescothes/C03532
heal.classificationURI	http://skos.um.es/unescothes/C00483
heal.classificationURI	N/A-Επιστήμες
heal.classificationURI	N/A-Διοίκηση επιχειρήσεων
heal.identifier.secondary	doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.003
heal.language	en
heal.access	campus
heal.recordProvider	Τεχνολογικό Εκπαιδευτικό Ίδρυμα Αθήνας. Σχολή Διοίκησης και Οικονομίας. Τμήμα Διοίκησης Επιχειρήσεων. Κατεύθυνση Διοίκηση Επιχειρήσεων	el
heal.publicationDate	2012
heal.bibliographicCitation	Anastasopoulos, N. and Anastasopoulos, M. (January 2012). The evolutionary dynamics of audit. European Journal of Operational Research. 216(2). pp. 469-476. Elsevier B.V: 2012. Available from: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221711005091 [Accessed 22/06/2011]	en
heal.abstract	A critical issue in auditing is provisioning of reasonable assurance that the financial reports are free from material misstatements. The auditing detection problem can be viewed as a two-player game between the auditor and the auditee where the auditor aims at eliminating misstatements, reducing at the same time his audit efforts, while the auditee aims at benefiting from fraudulent financial reporting and defalcation. In this paper, the auditing/fraud detection problem is modeled employing evolutionary game theory. It is proved that, given that the players have accurate information for the parameters involved in the problem, the auditing/fraud detection game is stable but not asymptotically stable. The case of the auditor being partially informed about the auditee firm is also studied and it is concluded that if the auditor is partially informed about the auditee firm, a more comprehensive audit is necessary to guarantee quality of audit. Finally, analytical results are derived concerning the impact of audit tenure on audit quality.	en
heal.publisher	Elsevier B.V.	en
heal.journalName	European Journal of Operational Research	en
heal.journalType	peer-reviewed
heal.fullTextAvailability	true